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Abstract 
In this paper, we improve Bruschweiler’s algorithm such that only one query is 
needed for searching the single object z from N=2n unsorted elements. Our algorithm 
construct the new oracle query function g(.) satisfying g(x)=0 for all input x, except 
for one, say x=z, where g(z)=z. To store z, our algorithm extends from one ancillary 
qubit to n ancillary qubits. We then measure these ancillary qubits to discover z. We 
further use our ensemble search algorithm to attack classical public key cryptosystems. 
Given the ciphertext C=Ek(m, r) which is generated by the encryption function Ek(), a 
public key k, a message m, and a random number r, we can construct an oracle query 
function h(.) satisfying h(m’, r’)=0 if Ek(m’, r’)¹C and h(m’, r’)= (m’, r’) if Ek(m’, 
r’)=C. There is only one object, say (m, r), can be discovered in decryption of C. By 
preparing the input with all possible states of (m’, r’), we can thus use our ensemble 
search algorithm to find the wanted object (m, r). Obviously, we break the classical 
public key cryptosys tems under the ciphertext attack by performing the oracle query 
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function only one time.   
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1. Introduction 
Recently, NMR (Nuclear Magnetic Resonance) ensemble computing [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 
has attracted many researchers. An NMR ensemble computer contains many identical 
molecules. Each molecule, like a quantum computer, contains massive different spins 
which denote qubits. NMR differs from a quantum computer in that the result of a 
measurement is the expectation value of the observable, rather than a random 
eigenvalue thereof.  Using this property, NMR can solve the SAT problem [2] and 
the search problem [1]. The search problem is to search a single object from N= n2  
unsorted elements. This problem can be easily solved by O(N) queries in classical 
computer. To reduce the number of queries, Grover [4] presented a quantum search 
algorithm such that the wanted object can be discovered by O( N ) queries. However, 
Bruschweiler’s ensemble search algorithm [1] in NMR ensemble computer only 
requires O(logN) queries in the search of a single object in N= n2  unsorted elements. 
In Bruschweiler’s algorithm, the input state with (n+1) qubits is a mixed state whose 
ancillary qubit and the ith qubit are set to zero. Thus, the input state is mixed by N/2 
pure states. The ith query can determine the ith bit value of the wanted object.  After 
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logN queries, Bruschweiler’s algorithm can discover the wanted object. 
In this paper, we improve Bruschweiler’s algorithm such that only one query is 
needed for searching the wanted object. Our algorithm extends from one ancillary 
qubit to n ancillary qubits. Similar structure can be found in Helon and 
Protopopescu’s algorithm [3] which uses k ancillary qubits to specify the minimal 
precision of summing up function values. We then construct the oracle query function 
g(.) satisfying g(x)=0 for all input x, except for one, say x=z, where g(z)=z. We then 
prepare 2n qubits, including n qubits for representing the elements and n ancillary 
qubits for storing the result of the oracle query function. We further obtain z by 
measuring these ancillary qubits.   
We will use our ensemble search algorithm to attack classical public key 
cryptosystems. Let Ek(m, r) be the encryption function, where k is a public key, m is a 
message, and r is a random number. We want to discover the message m from the 
ciphertext C=Ek(m, r). Because E(.) and k are published in classical public key 
cryptosystems, we can generate an oracle query function h(.) satisfying  
h(m’, r’)=
ïî
ï
í
ì
=
¹
C,)r ,(mE if  )r ,(m
C,)r ,(mE if           0
,,
k
,,
,,
k  
for all input (m’,  r’). There is only one object, say (m, r), can be discovered in 
decryption of C. By preparing the input with all possible states of (m’, r’), we can thus 
use our ensemble search algorithm to find the wanted object (m, r). Obviously, we 
 4 
break the classical public key cryptosystems under the ciphertext attack by performing 
the oracle query function only one time.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review 
Bruschweiler’s ensemble search algorithm. Section 3 presents a novel quantum 
ensemble search algorithm. Using this presented algorithm, we attack classical public 
key cryptosystems in Section 4. Section 5 draws the conclusions. 
2. Review of Bruschweiler’s ensemble search algorithm 
Bruschweiler’s ensemble search algorithm aims to search a single object in 
N= n2  unsorted elements. Before describing Bruschweiler’s algorithm, we introduce 
spin Liouville space which is used for NMR computation. First, the n-qubit state 
abaabaa==y ...010...0100 , one of 2n eigenstates of the Zeeman Hamiltonian, 
where a  denotes spin “up” and b  denotes spin “down”, can be mapped on state 
a
n1n321 II...III
babayys -==  in spin Liouville space [5]. Here, 
ababa
n1n321 II...III -  is the direct product of  
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=+=aa=a
00
01
)I21(
2
1
I kzkkkk  and 
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=-=bb=b
10
00
)I21(
2
1
I kzkkkk , 
where }n ..., ,2 ,1{k Î , kzI2  is the Pauli matrix zs  and k1  is the unity operator of 
the subspace of spin kI . Spin kI can also be viewed as a qubit. According to 2
n 
n-qubit states 11...11,...,01...00,00...00
1210 n
===
-
yyy , we have 
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bbbbbaaaaaaa sss n1n2112n1n211n1n210 II...II,...,II...II,II...II n ---- ===  in spin 
Liouville space. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the value of the element is equal to its 
index. For example, the third element is 3. If we want to search z, we define an oracle 
query function f: }1,0{}1,0{ n ®  that outputs 0 for all input x, f(x)=0, except for one, 
say x=z, where f(z)=1. In spin Liouville space, we rewrite f(.) as  
f( xs )=
î
í
ì
=
¹
. xif   ,1
, xif   ,0
z
z
 
We further prepare an ancillary qubit 0I , which is initially set to a state, to store the 
output of f(.). Thus, the action of f(.) can be described as a permutation with (n+1) 
qubits [1]. In spin Liouville space, we can construct the unitary transformation Uf 
satisfying  
Uf( s
a
0I )=
ïî
ï
í
ì
=
=
.1)f( if   ,I
,0)f( if   ,I
0
0
ss
ss
b
a
 
for the input state sa0I . Then, the evaluation of f(
.) is determined by the sign of the 
resonance of the readout spin 0I . If the sign is -1 (
a
0I ), f(s )=0; if it is +1 (
b
0I ), 
f(s )=1. The sign can be further determined by the measurement on 0I . We can 
rewrite f(s ) as  
f(s ) = }IUIU{
2
1
0zf0f
+- saTr .  (1) 
If we want to evaluate the sum of function evaluation of M states, say å
=
M
1j
i )(f js  for 
ji
s is a state from {
1210 n
,...,,
-
sss }, we generally require M function evaluations in 
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classical computer. However, using Equation (1), we have  
2
1M
)(f)(f
M
1j
M
1j
ii jj
-
+=å å
= =
ss , 
where the input state å
=
M
1j
i j
s is mixed by a linear combination of M states. We then 
require only one function evaluation to compute å
=
M
1j
i )(f js . But, how to compute 
å
=
M
1j
i )(f js  by using NMR measurement? When we measure 0I  of Uf( å
=
M
1j
i0 j
I sa ), we 
will obtain the sum of the sign of the resonance of the readout spin 0I . The sum will 
be either –M or –M+2. By adding (M-1) to the sum, we get the result -1 or +1. If the 
result is -1, å
=
M
1j
i )(f js =0; if it is +1, å
=
M
1j
i )(f js =1. 
For simplicity, we describe Bruschweiler’s algorithm by the following example. 
Assume that we want to find one element z=(001)2 from 8 unsorted elements. We 
need the oracle query function f(.) that outputs 0 for all input x, f(x)=0, except for one, 
say x=z, where f(z)=1.We then construct an NMR system with four qubits, say I0, I1, 
I2, and I3, where I0 is an ancillary qubit and the other qubits represent 8 elements. In 
spin Liouville space, we set the target state baa 321 III  because the wanted object is z 
= (001)2.  According to the target state, we construct the unitary transformation Uf 
satisfying Uf( js
a
0I )= js
a
0I for all input state js
a
0I , except for the target state 
js
a
0I =
baaa
3210 IIII , where Uf(
baaa
3210 IIII )=
baab
3210 IIII .  Let 
aa
k0 II  be 
babababaa /
n
/
k
/
2
/
10 I...I...III , which is mixed by 2
n-1 states. To discover the first bit 
value of z, we prepare the input state  
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aa
10 II =
bbaaabaabaaaaaaababaaa
3210321032103210
/
3
/
210 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII +++= . 
We then perform the unitary transformation Uf on 
aa
10 II  and obtain 
Uf(
aa
10 II ) = 
bbaaabaabaabaaaa
3210321032103210 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII +++ .  
The sign of the resonance of the readout spin 0I  determines the result of function f  
evaluation. If f(.)=0, the sign is –1 ( a0I ); otherwise, the sign is +1(
b
0I ). Thus, the 
second term yields the sign +1 as output on spin 0I  and the other terms yield -1. We 
can measure 0I  of Uf(
aa
10 II ) and obtain the total intensity (-1)+1+(-1)+(-1) = –2. 
We further evaluate f( aa 10 II )=1 by adding M-1=3, where M=2
3-1.  Because 
f( aa 10 II )=1, the first bit of z will be 0. Similarly, we can discover the other two bits of 
z by evaluating f( aa 20 II ) and f(
aa
30 II ). Because Uf(
aa
20 II ) = 
babaaababaabaaaa
3210321032103210 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII +++ , we obtain the total intensity 
(-1)+1+(-1)+(-1) = –2 after measuring 0I . We further evaluate f(
aa
20 II )=1 by adding 
23-1-1=3. The second bit of z will be 0. Next, because Uf(
aa
30 II ) = 
abbaaabaabaaaaaa
3210321032103210 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII +++ , we obtain the total intensity 
(-1)+(-1)+(-1)+(-1) = –4 after measuring 0I . We further evaluate f(
aa
30 II ) = -1 by 
adding 23-1-1=3. The third bit of z will be 1. At last, we can discover z = (001)2 after 
three oracle queries. In general, Bruschweiler’s algorithm only requires logN oracle 
queries to discover the wanted object from N unsorted elements. 
3. Novel ensemble search algorithm 
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Assume that we want to search the object z from N= n2  unsorted elements, say a0, 
a1, … , aN-1. Without loss of generality, let ai = i. In this section, we improve 
Bruschweiler’s algorithm by constructing new oracle query function g(.) satisfying 
g(x)=0 for all input x, except for one, say x=z, where g(z)=z. In NMR computer, we 
prepare n qubits I1,  I2, … , In, to represent the elements and n ancillary qubits I01, 
I02, … , I0n, to store the result of the oracle query function g(.). If we rewrite z = 
z1z2… zn, where zi { }ba ,Î , we have  
g( js )=
î
í
ì
=
¹
z.j if   z,
,zj if   ,0
 
We can construct the unitary transformation Ug satisfying  
Ug( j0n0201 I...II s
aaa )=
ïî
ï
í
ì
=
=
.z)g( if   ,I...II
,0)g( if   ,I...II
jj
z
0n
z
02
z
01
jj0n0201
n21 ss
ssaaa
 
Having Ug, we can perform the following ensemble search algorithm to discover the 
wanted object. 
Step 1: First, we prepare 2n qubits I01, I02,… , I0n, I1, I2, … , In, which are initially set to 
a states. We apply the Walsh-Hadamard Transformation H to the last n qubits 
and obtain the input state of Ug: 
.I...III...III...II)I...III...I(IU 0n0201
/
n
/
2
/
10n0201n210n0201H
aaabababaaaaaaaaa ==  
Step 2: We perform the operation Ug which applies g(.) to the last n qubits and then 
stores the result in the ancillary qubits. Thus, we have 
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å
-
¹=
+=
12
zj0,j
j0n0201z
z
0n
z
02
z
010n0201g I...II...III)I...II(U
n21
n
ss aaaaaa . 
Step 3: We perform NMR measurement on the ancillary qubits. We obtain the total 
intensity of I01, I02,… , I0n. By adding M-1=2n-1, we compute the signs for I01, 
I02,… , I0n. If the sign is -1 for I0i, we have the ith bit of z is 0; otherwise, if the 
sign is +1, the ith bit of z is 1. At last, we output the wanted object z according 
to these signs. 
Example 1: 
Assume that we want to find one element z=(001)2 from 8 unsorted elements. We 
construct the oracle query function g(.) that outputs 0 for all input x, g(x)=1, except 
for one, say x=z, where g(z)=z. We then construct an NMR system with six qubits, 
say I01, I02, I03, I1, I2, and I3, where I01, I02, I03 are ancillary qubits and the other qubits 
represent 8 elements. In spin Liouville space, we set the target state baa 321 III  
because the wanted object is z = (001)2.  According to the target state, we construct 
the unitary transformation Ug satisfying Ug( js
aaa
030201 III )= js
aaa
030201 III for all 
input state js
aaa
030201 III , except for the target state 
js
aaa
030201 III =
baaaaa
321030201 IIIIII , where 
Ug(
baaaaa
321030201 IIIIII )=
baabaa
321030201 IIIIII .  Let the input state 
aaa
030201 III  
be bababaaaa /3
/
2
/
1030201 IIIIII , which is mixed by 2
3 states. We follow our algorithm 
to discover the wanted object z = (001)2. 
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Step 1: First, we prepare six qubits, say I01, I02, I03, I1, I2, and I3, which are set to a 
state. We then apply the Walsh-Hadamard Transformation H to I1, I2, I3 and 
obtain the input state of Ug: 
UH(
aaaaaa
321030201 IIIIII )=
aaa
030201 III . 
Step 2: We perform the operation Ug which applies g(.) to I1, I2, I3 and then stores the 
result in the ancillary qubits. Thus, we have 
+++= 203020110302010030201030201g IIIIIIIII)III(U sss
aaabaaaaaaaa
3030201 III s
aaa + 4030201 III s
aaa + 5030201 III s
aaa + 6030201 III s
aaa + 7030201 III s
aaa . 
Step 3: We perform NMR measurement on the ancillary qubits. We obtain the total 
intensity –8, -8 and -6 after measuring I01, I02 and I03, respectively. By adding 
23-1=7, we have the sign -1, -1 and +1 for I01, I02 and I03. At last, we output the 
wanted object z = (001)2. 
Discussion: 
In the following, we discuss our ensemble search algorithm from three cases. 
First, we give the reason why oracle function g(.) can be implemented by a unitary 
operation.  Second, we must modify the input size when N is not the power of 2. Third, 
we must face the accurate problem when the measurement error occurs.  
Case 1: 
Brüschweiler [1] showed that the oracle function )(f ×  can be implemented by 
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the unitary operation if )(f ×  is described as a permutation function. The used oracle 
function g(.) in our algorithm is also described as a permutation function with (2n) 
qubits: I01, I02, … , I0n, I1, I2, … , In. In the following, we give an example to understand 
that the oracle function g(.) can be described as a permutation function. Assume that 
we want to search the object z = (10)2 from 4 unsorted elements. We then need two 
qubits, say 1I  and 2I , and two ancillary qubits, say I01 and I02. We construct an 
oracle function g(.) satisfying g(0)=0, g(1)=0, g(2)=2, and g(3)=0. Thus, Fig. 1 shows 
that g(.) operates on 1I  and 2I  with the output stored on I01 and I02. Obviously, the 
action of g(.) can be viewed as a permutation of all states spanned by I01, I02, I1 and I2. 
Therefore, we can implement the unitary operation Ug corresponding to the oracle 
function g(.). 
 
Fig. 1: Graphical representation of an oracle query function g(.) operating on qubits  
I1 and I2 as a permutation using two ancillary qubits 01I , 02I  with the output 
stored on 01I  and 02I . 
Case 2: 
If N is not the power of 2, say n1n 2N2 <<- , we add extra N2n -  elements 
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which are different from z. We then prepare n qubits to represent these elements. Thus, 
our algorithm can discover the wanted object from 2n elements.  
Case 3: 
The measurement sensitivity for the ancillary qubits is a limitation on our 
algorithm. For ith ancillary qubit, only one out of N inputs yields b0iI . These n 
ancillary qubits have the same measurement sensitivity because the measurement on 
ancillary qubits cannot influence the input states. Thus, our algorithm and 
Bruschweiler’s [3] have the same measurement sensitivity. Similar analysis can be 
found in Helon and Protopopescu’s algorithm [3]. Let d be the measurement error for 
a single experimental trial. Assume that  d = k2
1
. If k³ n, the adequate measurement 
sensitivities give us a correct measured value. Otherwise, we may obtain a wrong 
measured value. However, the measurement error can be reduced by repeating our 
algorithm a number of times. The measurement error scales inversely with the 
square-root of the number of experimental trials [1, 7]. Assume that dN  is the 
number of experimental trials. Then, if we want to obtain the correct measured value, 
dN  must satisfy nk 2
1
N
1
2
1
<´
d
. It implies that )kn(22N -d > . We thus require 
)2( )kn(2 -O  oracle queries to find the wanted element. When nk » , our algorithm 
only requires )1(O  oracle query. But, when nk << , our algorithm requires )2( n2O  
oracle queries. 
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Bruschweiler [1] also showed that his algorithm is more efficient than Grover’s 
algorithm [4] for databases of size N satisfying 
.logNNN 2-< d  
Similarly, our algorithm is more efficient than Grover’s algorithm for databases of 
size N satisfying 
.NN 2-< d  
With current NMR spectrometer technology, the measurement error is at least 10-7 [7]. 
Thus, our algorithm efficiently searches a single object from N £ 230 unsorted 
elements. 
 
4. Attacks of classical public key cryptosystems 
In this section, we will use our presented ensemble search algorithm to attack 
classical public key cryptosystems. Let Ek(m, r) be the encryption function from {0, 
1}n1+ n2 to {0, 1}n, where k is a public key, m is a message with n1 bits, and r is a 
random number with n2 bits. Given the ciphertext C=Ek(m, r) with n bits, we want to 
discover the message m by using our presented ensemble search algorithm. Because 
Ek(.) and k are published in classical public key cryptosystems, we can generate an 
oracle query function h(.) satisfying  
h(m’, r’)=
ïî
ï
í
ì
=
¹
C,)r ,(mE if  )r ,(m
C,)r ,(mE if           0
,,
k
,,
,,
k  
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for all input (m’,  r’). There is only one object, say (m, r), can be discovered in 
decryption of C. In NMR computer, we prepare n1 qubits I11, I12, … , I1n1, to represent 
the messages,  n2 qubits I21, I22, … , I2n2, to represent random numbers and (n1 + n2) 
ancillary qubits I01, I02, … , I0(n1+ n2), to store the result of the oracle query function h(
.).  
Let 
,II...II,...,II...II,II...II
111n1111 1n1)1(n12111)1(21n1)1(n1211111n1)1(n121110
bbbbbaaaaaaa sss ---- ===
.II...II,...,II...II,II...II
222
n
2222 2n1)2(n22211)2(22n1)2(n2221212n1)2(n222120
bbbbbaaaaaaa sss ---- ===
If we rewrite m = m1m2… mn1 and r = r1r2… rn2, where mi , ri { }ba ,Î , we have  
h(
11j
s , 
22j
s )=
î
í
ì
=
¹
.C)j,(jE if   ),j,(j
,C)j,(jE if           ,0
21k21
21k  
We can construct the unitary transformation Uh which applies h( .) to I11, I12, … , I1n1, 
I21, I22, … , I2n2, and stores the result in I01, I02, … , I0(n1+ n2). Thus, we have  
ïî
ï
í
ì
=
¹
=
++
+
+
.C)j,(jE if   ,...III...II
,C)j,(jE if                                ,I...II
)I...II(U
21k2j1j
r
)n0(n
r
1)0(n
m
0n
m
02
m
01
21k2j1j)n0(n0201
2j1j)n0(n0201h
21
2n
21
1
1
1n
1
21
2121
2121 ss
ss
ss
aaa
aaa
Having Uh, we can perform the following ensemble search algorithm to discover the 
message m. 
Step 1: First, we prepare 2(n1+ n2) qubits I01, I02, … , I0(n1+ n2), I11, I12, … , I1n1, I21, 
I22, … , I2n2, which are initially set to a states. We apply the Walsh-Hadamard 
Transformation H to the last (n1+ n2) qubits I11, I12, … , I1n1, I21, I22, … , I2n2, 
and obtain the input state of Uh : 
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UH(
aaaaaaaaa
2121 2n22211n1211)n0(n0201
I...III...II...III + )=
aaa
)n0(n0201 21
...III + . 
Step 2: We perform the operation Uh which applies h(.) to the last (n1+ n2) qubits and 
stores the result in the ancillary qubits. Thus, we have 
å å
-
¹
=
-
¹
=
+++
+
+
=
12
and mj
0j
12
rj
0j
2j1j)n0(n02012r1m
r
)n0(n
r
1)0(n
m
0n
m
02
m
01
)n0(n0201h
1n
1
1
2
2
2
2121
2n
21
1
1
1n
1
21
21
...III...II...III
) ...III (U
n
ssss aaa
aaa
 
Step 3: We perform NMR measurement on the ancillary qubits. We obtain the total 
intensity of I01, I02, … , I0(n1+ n2). By adding M-1=2
(n1+n2)-1, we compute the 
signs for I01,  I02, … , I0n1. If the sign is -1 for I0i, the i
th bit of m is 0; 
otherwise, if the sign is +1, the ith bit of m is 1. At last, we output the 
message m according to these signs. 
In the following, we use our algorithm to attack two cryptosystems: RSA [8] 
and McEliece’s [6] cryptosystems.  
Example 2:Attack on RSA [8] 
In this example, we use our algorithm to attack RSA cryptosystem. Let (e, N) be 
the RSA public key. The RSA encryption function is E(e, N) (m, r) = me mod N. 
Obviously, the RSA encryption function doesn’t require random numbers. For 
simplicity, we choose (e, N) = (7, 15) to explain our attack. Given the ciphertext C= 
me mod N = 2, which is generated by the message m=8, we construct the oracle query 
 16 
function h(.) satisfying 
h(
11j
s )=
ïî
ï
í
ì
=
¹
.2)(jE if   ,j
,2)(jE if    ,0
115) (7,1
115) (7,  
Because N is of 4 bits and m=m1m2m3m4=abaa, we use 8 qubits I01, I02, I03, I04, I11, 
I12, I13, I14, to construct the unitary transformation Uh satisfying  
ïî
ï
í
ì
=
¹
=
.2)(jE if   ,IIII
,2)(jE if        ,IIII
)IIII(U
115) (7,1j
m
04
m
03
m
02
m
01
115) (7,1j04030201
1j04030201h
1
4321
1
1 s
s
s
aaaa
aaaa  
Having Uh, we perform the following steps to discover message m.    
Step 1: We prepare 8 qubits I01, I02, I03, I04, I11, I12, I13, I14, which are initially set to a 
states. We apply the Walsh-Hadamard Transformation H to the last 4 qubits I11, 
I12, I13, I14, and obtain the input state of Uh : 
UH(
aaaaaaaa
1413121104030201 IIIIIIII )=
aaaa
04030201 IIII . 
Step 2: We perform the operation Uh which applies h(.) to the last 4 qubits and stores 
the result in the ancillary qubits. Thus, we have 
å
¹
=
+=
15
8j
0j
1j0403020118040302010403
a
0201h
1
1
IIIIIIII) IIII(U ss aaaaaaabaaa  
Step 3: We perform NMR measurement on the ancillary qubits. We obtain the total 
intensity –14, -16, -16 and -16 after measuring I01, I02, I03 and I04, respectively. 
By adding 24-1=15, we have the sign +1, -1, -1 and -1 for I01, I02, I03 and I04. At 
last, we output the wanted object m= (1000)2 = 8. 
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Example 3:Attack on McEliece’s public key cryptosystem [6] 
In this example, we use our algorithm to attack McEliece’s public key 
cryptosystem. Let G’ be the k×n generator matrix of a Goppa codes that corrects up to 
t errors. Let the public key be G=SG’P, where S is an inversible k×k matrix and P is a 
random n×n permutation matrix. The encryption function is EG(m, r) = mG + r, where 
m is a message matrix with dimension 1×k and r is a random error vector of size n 
that has at most t’ entries for t’ £ t. Assume that t’ is known. We can obtain the domain 
of r, say '0r , 
'
1r , … , 
'
dr .  For simplicity, we choose k = 2, n=7, t=2 and 
G= ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
. We can deduce that d »  28 from t=2. We can rearrange these 
random numbers with 5 bits by .,...,, '2
'
121
'
020 dd rrr === sss   Assume that the 
ciphertext C = mG + r =[ ]1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 , which is generated by the message m=[1 1] 
and r = [ ]1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 . Assume that r = '10r .  In this example, we must transfer the 
matrix into the binary number. Thus we have G=( 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 )2, C = 
( 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 )2. According to C = ( 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 )2, we construct the oracle query 
function h(.) satisfying 
h(
11j
s , 
22j
s )=
î
í
ì
=
¹
.1) 1 0 0 1 0 1 0()j,(jE if   ),j,(j
,1) 1 0 0 1 0 1 0()j,(jE if           ,0
221G21
221G  
Because m and r are respectively represented by 2 bits and 5 bits, we can construct the 
unitary transformation Uh, which applies h(.) to I11, I12, I21, I22, … , I25, and stores the 
result in I01, I02, … , I07. Thus, we have  
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ïî
ï
í
ì
=
¹
=
.1) 1 0 0 1 0 1 0()j,(jE if   ,...IIII
,1) 1 0 0 1 0 1 0()j,(jE if             ,I...II
)I...II(U
221G2j1j
r
07
r
03
m
02
m
01
221G2j1j070201
2j1j070201h
21
7121
21
21 ss
ss
ss
aaa
aaa
 
Having Uh, we perform the following steps to discover message m.    
Step 1: We prepare 14 qubits I01, I02, … , I07, I11, I12, I21, I22, … , I25 which are initially 
set to a states. We apply the Walsh-Hadamard Transformation H to the last 7 
qubits I11, I12, I21, I22, … , I25, and obtain the input state of Uh: 
UH(
aaaaaaaa
2522211211070201 I...IIIII...II )=
aaa
070201 I...II . 
Step 2: We perform the operation Uh which applies h(.) to the last 7 qubits and then 
store the result in the ancillary qubits. Thus, we have 
å å
¹
=
¹
=
+=
3
and 3(j
0j
31
)10j
0j
2j1j0702012(10)1307060504030201070201h
1
1
2
2
21
.I...IIIIIIIII) I...II(U ssss aaaabababbaaa
 
Step 3: We perform NMR measurement on the ancillary qubits. We obtain the total 
intensity –126, -126 after measuring I01, I02, respectively. By adding 27-1=127, 
we have the sign +1, +1for I01, I02. At last, we output the wanted object m= 
(11)2.  
Discussion: 
Section 3 gives us that our algorithm can efficiently solve the searching problem 
for the database of the size N £ 230. Therefore, we only attack the RSA cryptosystem 
 19 
with modulus N of less than 30 bits. Similarly, we efficiently break McEliece’s public 
key cryptosystem when k+d £ 30.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper has presented the new oracle query function g(.) to improve 
Bruschweiler’s algorithm such that only one query is needed for searching the single 
object z from N=2n unsorted elements. The new oracle query function g(.) satisfies 
g(x)=0 for all input x, except for one, say x=z, where g(z)=z. To store z, our algorithm 
extends from one ancillary qubit to n ancillary qubits. We then measure these ancillary 
qubits to discover z. According to our analysis, our algorithm can efficiently discover 
the wanted object if N £ 230. We further use our ensemble search algorithm to attack 
classical public key cryptosystems. Given the ciphertext C=Ek(m, r), we can construct 
an oracle query function h(.) satisfying h(m’, r’)=0 if Ek(m’, r’)¹C and h(m’, r’)= (m’, 
r’) if Ek(m’,  r’)=C. There is only one object, say (m, r), can be discovered in 
decryption of C. By preparing the input with all possible states of (m’, r’), we can thus 
use our ensemble search algorithm to find the wanted object (m, r). With current 
NMR spectrometer technology, we break the RSA cryptosystem with up to 30-bit 
modulus.  
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